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BitlEF OF RESPONDEr~rr 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an equitable decision of the 
lower court, denying plaintiff-appellants' application for an 
extraordinary writ compelling the defendant Secretary of 
State to certify the Human Rights Party as a political party 
for the next ensuing election. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a hearing on May 8, 1972, the 
plaintiff-appellants' application for extraordinary relief was 
denied by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson. An amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law resulted from a 
hearing on June 7, 1972, reaffirming the denial of 
extraordinary relief and determining that the signature 
1 
distriln1tion _requirement of Section 20-3-2, U.C.A. (1953). 
w~s "not void uy rc;ison of the equal protection clauses of 
the State and Federal constitutions." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks a ruling of this Court 
sustaining the judgm~nt of the lower court as being within it~ 
sound discretion and 1n accordance with law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts as substantially correct the 
Statement of Facts as it appears in the appellants' brief, 
except for the few matters hereinafter stated by way of 
amendment or clarification. 
While the party organizers submitted over 800 
signatures, the required certification of signatures by clerks 
of the various counties showed only 501 of the signers to be 
registered voters as required by the statute. 
Pl;iintiff-appellants stipulated that they could have complied 
with the ten-county, ten-signature requirement had they 
made the effort. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO STANDING 
TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE SUBJECT STATUTES. 
It is not evident from reading the court's opinion that 
the defendants in Moore v. Ogilvie 394 U.S. 814 89 S. Ct. 
1493, 23 L. Ed. 1(1969), raised the question of standing. 
However, Justice Stewart in his dissent stated, "There is 
absolutely no indication in the record that appellants could 
not, if they had made the effort, have easiiy satisfied Illinois' 
fifty-county, two hundred signature requirement". (Supra at 
820, 821 ). Here, however, the state official defendant has 
raised the issue of plaintiff's standing and on that point the 
stipulation of the parties states: "Petitioners could have 
o!Jtairwd sufficient additional sign<Jtures to qualify as an 
rmlcpcncle11t p<1rty under the. aforesaid law if they have 
endeavored W do so after learnmg_t~Jt the members living in 
those counties who s1~1ned the pet1t1on were not qualified to 
sign it" (paragraph 14 on page 4 of the Stipulation). 
POINT II 
THIS CASE CAN, AND SHOULD, BE DECIDED 
UPON NONCONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS. 
The case involving the same issues filed by the party 
plain tiff in the state court was decided upon a 
nonconstitutional basis, namely that the plaintiffs there did 
not have standing to challenge the subject statute because 
they did not make the effort referred to in Point 11 above 
(Human Rights Party and Montague v. Miller, Salt Lake 
County No. 205449). 
Another nonconstitutional basis on which the state 
court might decide this case would be on the basis that 
obtaining nine qualified signatures in the 10th county was 
substantial comr:iliance with the law in question. Such a 
contention under somewhat similar facts was successful in 
the case of O'Donnell v. Ryan, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 885, affirmed 
in 13 N. Y. 2d 885. 
Although no case sufficiently identical on its facts has 
been found to be dispositive on the instant case, the principle 
that cases will not be decided on constitutional grounds 
unless it is unavoidable is well established. Professor Antleau 
wrote on this point in Modern Constitutional Law, (Vol. 2), 
as follows: 
Sec. 15:33: The United States Supreme Court has 
often announced that it will not decide constitutional 
issues unless doing so is unavoidable. Rosenberg v. 
F/euti (1963) 374 U.S. 449, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 83 S. 
Ct. 1804. It said, for instance, in 1952: "This Court 
will not pass upon the constitutionality of an act of 
Congress ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable. 
. . . " United States v. Hayman ( 1952) 342 U.S. 2.05, 
96 L. Ed. 232, 244, 72 S. Ct. 263. The same judicial 
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allstinencc custon:arily prevails with reference to acts 
of the stote lc~g1sloture5, as well as to executive 
dee isions and procedures at trial. "Constitutional 
adjudication should where possible be avoided," says 
the court. NAACP v. Alabama (1958) 357 US 449 
2L Ed 2d 1488, 1497, 78SCt1163. ' 
The Supreme Court avoids constitutional issues 
frequently by deciding cases on nonconstitutional 
grounds, rather than on the claims of 
unconstitutionality. Communist Party of United 
States v. Subversive Activities Control Board ( 1956) 
351 US 115, 100 L Ed 1003, 76 S Ct 663. For 
example, in 1948, the court decided that judicial 
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in the 
District of Columbia violated national public policy, 
rather than the Fifth Amendment. Said the court: "It 
is a well settled principle that this court will not 
decide constitutional questions where other grounds 
are available and dispositive of the issues of the case." 
Hurd v. Hodge ( 1948) 334 US 24, 92 L Ed 1i87, 68 
S Ct 847. The supreme Court will, if possible, decide 
cases on nonconstitutional grounds even when such 
grounds were not raised by the parties. Neese v. 
Southern R. Co. (1955) 350 US 77, 100 L Ed 60, 76 
S Ct 131. 
Another way the Supreme Court avoids 
constitutional adjudication.is by giving a construction 
to legislative acts that will avoid doubts as -to their 
constitutionality. Where a statute is susceptible of 
multiple constructions, the court will give the statute 
that construction which avoids determining that it is 
unconstitutional. United States v. CIO (1948) 335 US 
106, 92 L Ed 1849, 68 S Ct 1349; Schneider v. Smith 
(1968) 390 US 17, 19 L Ed 2d 799, 88 S Ct 682; 
United States v. Rumely ( 1953) 345 US 41, 97 L Ed 
770, 73 S Ct 543; United v. Witkovich (1957) 353 US 
194, 1 L Ed 2d 765, 77 S Ct 779. In 1936, Justice 
Brandeis remarked: 
"When the validity of an act· of the Congress is 
drawn in question, and even, if a serious d~ub~ of 
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal pnnc1ple 
that this Court will first ascertain whether a 
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lallCI grounds, l:owcvPr, have not figured significantly in 
coses raised 1n this areo_ and ore ~ot relevant to this inquiry. 
The only case depending on First Amendment support is 
Williams v. Rhoe/cs, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S. Ct. 5, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24 
(1968), which overturned Ohio's new party requirement 
because of its excessive burden on new parties. However the 
cases of Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 2J L. 
Ed. 2d 1 ( 1969) and Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 s. 
Ct. 1970 (1971), respectively ignore or dismiss First 
Amendment challenges to signature requirements for new 
parties. Utah's requirement is less burdensome than those in 
Moore and Jenness. It also is free of other harsh requirements 
imposed by Ohio, which were invalidated in Williams. The 
First Amendment claim is not well taken. Essentially, 
plaintiffs' case must rise or fall with their equal protection 
logic. 
In order to determine which equal protection test or 
measure to apply, a determination must first be made as to 
what specific rights are involved. The problem is that the 
specific rights here involved are not clearly defined. "The 
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend 
themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates 
always have at least some theoretical correlative effect on 
voters," Bullock v. Carter, 92 S. Ct. 849, 856 (1972). The 
same may be said of the rights of political parties, that those 
rights "do not lend themselves to neat separation" from the 
closely analogous rights of voters and candidates. Therefore, 
there is the dual problem of identifying which rights are 
directly involved and also what are the distinctions and 
perimeters of those rights. There appear to be three distinct 
groups of election rights potentially involved. They are: the 
right to vote; the right to seek (run for) public office, and the 
right of political organizations to gain ballot recognition as a 
political "party." 
Only one of the enumerated rights, i.e. the right to 
vote, is denominated a "fundamental right." Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Education, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 
16 L. Ed. 2d 169 ( 1966), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 
S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 ( 1964). The other two rights, 
i.e. the right of candidates to run for office and the right of 
an organized group of voters to obtain a ballot position, 
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wllilt! 1 eco~J11ized as serious and important, have never been 
held to be "fundamental." Since the recognition of a right as 
"fundamental;: requires the ap~lic~tion of ~he ."compelling 
state 111tErest test to det?rmine its const1tut1onality, the 
interrelation b.etw.ee1~ the ngh.t to vote and party qualifying 
requirements 1s s1gn1f1cant. S~nc~ Moore v. Ogilvie, Supra, 
which struck down an I lllno1s distributional signature 
requirement for new parties, used the "one man, one vote" 
logic from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. 
Ed. 2d 663 ( 1962) and Reynolds to justify that decision, it 
thereby concomitantly involves the right to vote. The extent 
to which the rights of voters were pivotal in Moore is not 
clear, and Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, at no 
point invokes the "fundamental right-compelling state 
interest" test, which wou Id be expected if the court 
considered it a voting right infringement. It remains 
therefore, to consider which test shou Id be applied and what 
the result of that application ought to be. 
The court, in Williams v. Rhodes, supra, in a case 
striking down Ohio's party qualification requirement of a 
15% voter petition, neither applied nor established a rigid 
standard, but rather noted: 
'In determining whether or not a state law 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must 
consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, 
the interests which the State claims to be protecting, 
and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by 
the classification." Supra at 29. 
This case-by-case approach sanctioned in Williams illuminates 
the failure of Moore to identify one single test to be applied. 
Moore is evidence of the Williams notion of individual 
scrutiny leading to an appropriate equal protection test. Not 
only does this suggest that the "compelling state interest" 
test is inappropriate in this species of election cases, but the 
court in February of this year appears to have created a new 
equal protection test in Bullock v. Carter, supra, a case 
striking down a Texas filing fee requirement for candidates. 
Therefore, an application of the Bullock standard to Sec. 
20-3-2(g)(2) follows, prefaced by a discussion of the "one 
man, one vote" principle as applied in Moore. 
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Juslice DoLHJlas in vvriti11q for the rrnijority in Moore 
un:iloqizccJ to the "one rnan, one vote" standards of the 
apportio11rncnl cases;, Moor~ was. the first such application of 
"one man, one vote principles 1n a non-representation area 
and it is not yet ccnain what specific standards are imparted 
!JV thilt a11alo~1y. Ne1th.er ~he language of that decision nor 
any subsequent appl 1catron has defined the numerical 
standards to be applied. Eliminating all other possible 
interpretations of the import of that analogy by logic, the 
Court's intention was most likely either that the standards of 
the apportionment cases by exactingly transplanted into the 
area of party qualification requirements or that the "one 
man, one vote" standards established in the area of 
reapportionment be generally and reasonably applied relative 
~o this unique and different area. 
The Moore court intimates that an opposite holding 
would be "out of line with our recent apportionment cases," 
indicriting at least some relationship to those "one man, one 
vote" standards. However, the concluding sentences of 
Justice Douglas' orinion reveal the basis of the standard. • · 
"This law thus discriminates against the residents of the 
populous counties of th8 State in favor of rural sections. It, 
therefore, lacks the equality to which the exercise of political 
rights is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment." 
(emphasis added). Moore v. Ogilvie, supra, at 819. The 
meaning of equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in any given circumstance has always reflected 
the peculiar rights involved. Hence, when Justice Douglas 
submerged the analogue of the "one man, one vote" 
principles of aprortionment cases in the "equality" standards 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the resulting standard differs 
from the strict "one man, one vote" measure of the 
apportionment cases. Moore produces an equal protection 
standard given additional definition by the "one man, one 
vote" principles of the apportionment cases. Logically, as 
you expand the application of a standard by analogy, its 
limits necessarily expand and take the shape of the modified 
subject. That is, when the object of a defining standard 
changes, the definitional limits of that standard change 
accordingly. The principles represented by the "one man, one 
vote" language in Moore should therefore be defined in light 
of this less fundamental election activity, i.e. qualifying 
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lielitions, and co11structed liberally. That does not dissipate " I I the "one rnan, 011c vote a11a. ogy, Jut rather is in keeping 
with the nature of the electron activity it measures. The 
application of stricter standJrds in apportionment cases in 
which voters are unequally represented is deserved. But here 
vvhci-e the issue is a distributional petition requirement fo; 
party recognition, where neither "votes" nor "voters" are 
directly involved, the standards should be more liberally 
construed in a way judiciously proportional to the rights 
involved, and in keeping with whatever equal protection test 
is appropriate. 
The "logic gap" created by the use of the analogy of 
the apportionment cases to a case involving a party 
qualification requirement is adequately bridged by the 
language ir. Moore. However, the need for liberal 
construction of "one man, one vote" principl-es is illustrated 
by the distinctions between the two analogues. 
First, in apportionment cases, the questioned 
distribution is fixed and the inequality is certain. In those 
cases, there cannot exist equality of representation until a 
statutory change occurs. Such is not the case with Utah's 
signature distribution requirement, which can in many 
different instances be found to be constitutionally 
satisfactory. It is not certain that the distribution of 
signatures resultant from the particular schematic design of 
the party's signature drive will be violative of the "equality" 
demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment and, as will be 
demonstrated below, it is more common to find a rough 
equality. 
Second, the reapportionment cases, specifically Baker 
and Reynolds, involve the under and over-representation of 
groups of voters. However, in these party qualification, 
voter-petition statutes, in Justice Stewart's words neither 
"votes" nor "voters" are involved. That is not to say that a 
party qualification requirement is not related to voting rights, 
but neither Moore nor this case involve voting rights or other 
rights denominated fundamental. Rather, the Utah statute 
regulates activities preparatory to the election--important but 
not fundamental. 
Third, in the apportionment cases, every voter in a 
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narticiil<1r g1~ogrophic>il unit h<is his vote effected. When an 
~ipportio11111c11t scheme is v(iolative of constitutional 
stJndar ds, a certd 1 n group or groups) of voters are 
under-represented and the remaining voters, are 
over represented. However, in the party qualification 
requirement embodied _in Sec. 20-3-2(g)(2), only the very few 
registered voters C!re d 1rectly effecte who sign the petitions. 
Hence, it cann?t b:. determined until after the party 
organization has 1dent1f1ed supporters willing and qualified to 
sign the petition wh8ther there is a violation of the 
"equality" ririnciples of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
freedom Cl potential party has in determining the distribution 
of its 500 signatures suspends any judgment on the equality 
of signature worth until the distribution can be individually 
appraised. To prove Constitutional inequality, inequality 
must exist. Since only 501 registered voters signed the 
petition (one more than the requisite number). no group of 
qualified supporters are shown to have been denied equal 
protection rights by virtue of the distribution requirement. 
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any violation of the 
principles of the equal protection clause here. 
Justice Douglas, in the Moore case, cites Gray v. 
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, as illustrative of the application of the 
equal protection standards of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
"one man, one vote" cases. Therefore, the value ratio 
(disµacity) of votes in Gray sheds some light on the 
comparative ratios here. In Gray, the value ratio of votes 
between under and over-represented geographical units 
ranged from 8 to 1 to 14 to 1. That disparity clearly violates 
the notions of "equality" in the Fourteenth Amendment. As 
well, the discrepancy in the Gray case is from five to nine 
times as high as the ratios in this case. The differences 
between the disfavored 1 llinois requirement and the present 
Utah requirement are a!so substantial in terms of a "one man, 
one vote" analysis. (See Appendix I for statistical analysis.) 
By determining optimum signature distribution among the 
requisite number of counties and then contrasting the 
statistical value of a signature in the least populous county 
with the statistical value of a signature in the middle and 
greater populated counties, it is possible to determine a value 
ratio reflecting the variation from a strict "one man, one 
vote" measure. In Illinois, the ratio of signature value 
between the least populous county required by the statute 
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(the filtir~th moc.t popt1lcitcd cou11ty) and the more populous 
countit~s commonly indicates a ratio of about 3.8 to 1. That 
is a sigr1dturc of a registered voter in the fiftieth most 
p~pulatr.d county in lllin.ois has 3.8 times as much impact 
(value) as that of a registered voter in one of the more 
populous counties. In Utah, on the other hand, using the 
signulurc value of the tenth most populated county, the ratio 
is approximately 1.6 to 1. Moreover, in Utah if the party 
movement is essentially based in one of the large counties, a 
nearly equal "one man, one vote" ratio exists between the 
first and tenth counties. (For example, if Salt Lake County 
provided 410 of the requisite 500 signatures, the value of a 
signature in Salt Lake County would be essentially equivalent 
to the value of a signature in the tenth most populated 
county.) It is clear that the variance in the Utah statute is 
very much le:;s than that of the abolished Illinois requirement 
or any other disfavored statute. The question remains 
whether the disproportion of the Utah requirement is 
sufficient of itself to justify its judicial exclusion. Where "one 
man, one vote" principles are liberally applied, as here in a 
petition situation, a 1.6 to 1 ratio is within reason. Since it is 
probable that the main focus of a political organizational 
movement in Utah will be in one or two of the more 
populous counties as in this case, the fact that a 
mathematical equaiity results in such a situation is additional 
justification for the subject statute. Therefore, while Utah's 
voter petition requirement for party recognition is capable of 
some disparity in signature value between lesser and greater 
populated counties, its substantial difference from the Illinois 
formula and the frequent equality in typical new party 
development satisfy the "one man, one vote" principles of 
Moore. 
The Utah requirement is therefore not inherently 
violative of the "equality" required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Nor have plaintiffs demonstrated here that 
Utah's requirement has constitutionally impermissible 
unequal impact on different groups of registered voters. It is 
important for the court to establish standards appropriate to 
the rights and state interests involved. Justice Holmes warned 
against rigidity in standards in this area, when he pointed out 
that, it "is important for this court to avoid extracting from 
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till' Vl'IY yc11cral languoCJe of the Fourteenth Amendment a 
~ystem of dcli1sive exactness .... " Louisville & Nashville R. Co. 
v. Barber Asphalt Co., 197 U.S. 430, 434 25 S. Ct. 466, 49 L. 
Ed. 819 (190'1) (Holmes, J.). Imposing numerical standards 
which would invalidate Utah's requirement would not be in 
kccpiny with the spirit and principle of the equal protection 
clause and would extend the "one man, one vote" analogy to 
a logical absurdity. 
The "one man, one vote" standard was only part of 
the analysis which the court went through in Moore, and it 
remains to ascertain which equal protection test ought to 
apply. Moore did not find all voter petition distribution 
requirements unconstitutional per se. Therefore, to strike 
down the Utah requirement without consideration of its 
reasonableness or the "reasonable necessity" of the 
requirement to the accomplishment of legitimate state 
interests would be an unwarranted extension of the Moore 
holding. Moreover, since Moore did not pronounce the right 
of political parties to ballot position "fundamental," the 
"fundamental right-compelling state interest" test is 
inappropriate. Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion. in the 
ori~1inal heJring before the single judge court, Williams v. 
Rhur!cs does not stand for the application of the "compelling 
state interest" test in this equal protection area. Rather, 
Williams holds that when the burden placed on ballot 
recognition of new parties is so great as to seriously restrict 
the First Amendment rights of free association, then a 
"compelling state interest" test applies. But Williams does 
not apply that test to the equal protection issues raised, 
instead suggesting the case-by-case scrutiny pointed out 
above. Even if a "compelling state interest" test were to be 
applied, Sec. 20-3-2(g) (2) would not automatically be 
invalidated, as there are several recent election cases 
recognizing "compelling state interests." Bendiger v. Ogilvie, 
335 F. Supp. 572 (1971), Jackson v. Ogilvie, 325 F. Supp. 
864 (1971). 
While the "fundamental right-compelling state 
interest" test is neither requisite nor appropriate for the 
disposition of this case the traditional "rational relationship" 
test is weak and als~ ill-suited for the protection of the 
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i:i:l'('rtc111l 1 iql1ls here in question. To circumvent the 
t!ilcrntiia of deciding between these two polarized and 
ricittlified tests and to avoid the uncertainty of awaiting a 
rlcfinition of rights as fundamental, the Supreme Court 
recently esti:iblished a new test for the evaluation and 
s;ifcgumd of cqllal . protection rights. Speaking for a 
un;itiimous court, Chief Justice Burger, in Bullock v. Carter 
struck clown a Texas filing fee requirement system, creatin~ 
and using a "reJsonable necessity" test. This test, as applied 
to Sec. 20 3-2(g)(2) is essentially three-phase: is the 
distributionul requirement reasonable, are there legitimate 
state interests involved, and is the distributional requirement 
reasonably 11ecessary for the accomplishment of the state 
inte1-ests. This test provides the courts with a flexible 
practical and realistic method of evaluating both individuai 
rights and stilte interests. An analysis of Sec. 20-3-2(g)(2) 
under this "reasonable necessity" test is dispositive of the 
constitutional validity and function of the Utah requirement. 
In considering the reasonableness of the Utah 
requirement ( 500 signatures of registered voters including at 
least ten registered voters from each of ten counties) a 
comparison with similar requirements of other states has 
considerable merit. There are two integral parts of the 
distributional requirement: the number of signatures required 
and the requisite distribution of signatures. A high signature 
quota sans distributional requirement is no more reasonable 
than a low signature requirement with a minimal 
distributional qualification. The Illinois distribution 
requirement invalidated in Moore required 25,000 signatures 
with at least 200 signatures each from 50 of the 103 
counties. On a proportional basis, the Illinois signature 
requirement is five times as high as Utah's and the per county 
requirement is nearly eight times as high. In the Ohio case of 
Williams v. Rhodes, 15% of the total vote for governor in the 
previous election was the numerical requirement for a new 
party petition. The Ohio requirement was invalidated on 
several grounds, particularly the violation of equal protection 
rights, since the existing parties needed to poll only 10% in 
the preceeding election. It appears that in Williams the court 
implicitly ruled that a 15% signature requirement, coupled 
with a number of other harsh requirements, was too great a 
burden on First Amendment and equal protection rights. 
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However, in Je!111css \:.
1
rortso11, 403 U.S. 431, 91 s. Ct. 
1970, 29 L. bl. 2d :.J,)"1 ( 1971 ), the court found CJ 5% 
siuiidture requirement .tor new parties neither violative of 
rqual rrotect1011 nor First Amendment riqhts. In a footnote, 
the Williams court po111ted out that 42 of the stiltes 
including Ut;ih, have a 1% or smaller voter petitio~ 
requirement for new parties, and none of these state statutes 
have been judicially overturned. 
From the comparative posture above, one moves to a 
closer scrutiny of the UtCJh requirement itself. To obtain a 
position on the ballot, an aspiring party must secure the 
signatures of 500 registered voters with a minimum of ten 
signatures from ten different counties. For an existing party 
to remain on the ballot, it must "poll for any of its 
candidates equivalent to two per cent of this total vote cast 
for illl representatives in Congress." Sec. 20-3-2(g)(1), U.C.A. 
1953. This would amount in 1972, to 7,462 votes (or 
signatures). An embryo political party in Utah is faced with 
significantly less stringent ballot requirements than an 
es1ablished rarty, amounting to a voter-count differential of 
6,962 (7,462 less the 500 now required). 
In weighing the reasonableness of the Utah 
requirement, a pragmatic view is essential. Neither the 
number of counties (10 of 27) nor the number of signatures 
per county ( 10) required by Utah statute can be considered 
burdensome. Rather, the numerical qualifications are so 
minimal as to be almost non-existent. The question more 
nearly appropriate is why Utah would impose such minimal 
requirements in the first place, since they require so little to 
be met. The reasons for the minimal distributional 
requirement, created by the 1969 amendment to Sec. 
20-3-2(g)(2), are the prevention of voter confusion, 
administrative efficiency, prevention of the waste of public 
monies, the protection of the integrity of the election 
process, and the minimal ratification of political movements 
to state voters, more fully discussed below. 
Another consideration is the framework within which 
Utah can constitutionally establish new party qualifications. 
It would be constitutionally permissible for the legislature to 
change the voter petition requirement for new parties upward 
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dS hirih dS !)'){,, u11clc1 the Jenness holdiiig, dmounting to 
w.r;~S s1911dtllrcs. It IS oliv1ous that a 5% signature 
rl'qllircn1ent, or evc11 o~e of 2%, is a greater burden on a 
!lr.dqliil(J riarty than 1s the 500 signature, ten-county 
tcri s i 911ature rcqu 1rernent presently status in Utah. 
ThcrPforc, Sec. 203-2(g)(2) is neither equivalent to those 
disti ibutional schemes struck down by various courts nor is it 
urire<ison;ibly arbitrary in and of itself. It is an attempt by the 
legislJture to establish a minimum level or standard of 
Jctivity 1ustifying ballot recognition. That the legislature has 
optt.?d for a requirement of significantly fewer signatures plus 
the minimal distributional requirement is evidence of 
thouqhtful and less burdensome alternative to a high 
signature requ irernent. 
The second phase of the Bullock test is the legitimacy 
of the stdte interests involved. There is a logical presumption 
in a legislative act, increasing with the chronological 
proximity of enactment, that the legislature is acknowledging 
and articulating a specific state interest. The presumption is 
not conclusive but is at least evidence that the legislature 
believed there were legitimate state interests represented. 
That Sec. 20-3-2( g) ( 2) was amended in 1969 to include the 
ten-counly ten-vote requirement indicates that this 
qualification is not an anachronistic vestige of less progressive 
time, but rather a recent modification reflecting a legislative 
attempt to improve the party qualification requirement. 
Essentially, the state interests represented by the 
distributional requirement focus around the preservation of 
the integrity of the election process. "There is surely an 
important state interest in requiring some preliminary 
showing of a significant modicum of support before printing 
the name of a political organization's candidate on the 
ballot--the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, 
deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at 
the general election." Jenness v. Fortson, supra, at 442. The 
facets of the state interest are therefore preclusion of voter 
co11fusion, administrative efficiency, public awareness of new 
political movements, and the prevention of the waste of 
public monies. Courts have recognized state interests in 
regulating elections, imposing minimum requirements ~or 
candidates and parties to obtain ballot positions, controlling 
the size of ballots, and in keeping frivolous or fraudulent 
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i:;incliiLi!r•'.; ,111d pa1tiPs uff the Lx1llot. See Jenness v. Fortson 
supra, IJ!L'lhe1inq1011 v. Adams, 3oq F. Supp. 318 (1970), 
fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592 (1970), Bodner v. Grav: 
129 So. 7d 419, 89 A.L.R. 2d 860 (1961), New Mexico v. 
Florina, 40 L.W. 2713 (1972). As well, the state hJs an 
j1·1terest 111 requiring a "party" to give minimal "notice" to 
rnore than a local area of the state. This is not the 
"state-wide" support notion which Moore seemed to 
discount as i.l valid interest. The Utah statute requires neither 
"state-1vide" participation nor "support" in the full sense of 
the word. Ten signatures in ten counties is more nearly a 
"qood faith" requirement of effort than a demonstration of 
"~tate-wide support." The objective is not to have 90 
supporters in nine counties other than the central county, 
but to have more than a one-county focus. 
This distinction between the single county focus and 
a state-wide focus can be seen in two ways. First, if a party is 
interested in nominating candidates for offices within a 
one-county scope, the alternative of fi I ing as independent 
candidates u 11der Sec. 20-3-38, U.C.A. 1953, is provided. 
Under this provision, independent candidates can give a five 
word description of their position, and all the candidates 
identifying with this cause could list themselves as the 
"Human Rights Coalition" and advertise accordingly. 
Therefore, an independent candidate representing a particular 
ideology and constituency can obtain a ballot position with 
300 signatures, 200 less than an independent party. Second, 
if a party with local focus desires to nominate a candidate for 
a state-wide or national office, the legislature has mandated 
that that party extend their operations to at least nine other 
counties to merit the benefits which accompany recognition 
as a party (the opportunity of securing ballot representation 
for the subsequent election and the right to nominate 
candidates with out submitting voter petitions for each). 
These two benefits given to qualified independent parties by 
the state are the only rationale for a group seeking 
recognition as a party rather than pursuing the independent 
candidate process. By running candidates under the 
independent candidate procedure rather than as an 
independent party, a group would lose no rights or oth~r 
benefits. While the party identification would appear !n 
different places (above the candidate's name for parties and 
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iiclnw 1lw c,rndidatr:'s mmr: for i11dcpcncJe11t caridid;ites), the 
;iiiilrty tu iidvcrtr:;t' for 11w party collectively, to prepare a 
platior rn and have c?mrnon positions, to associate and 
paiticipcitc 111 .the elc~tron as a group, and as a public vehicle 
for political ideas, 111 short, every activity essential to a 
political party would be available to the party nominating 
cariditJatcs through Sec. 20-3-38, U.C.A. 1953. To earn ballot 
recognition as a "party,''. a potential party must "notify" a 
srnattcri11~1 of people rn a scattering of counties and 
demonstrate good faith by making party efforts beyond a 
local activity. Therefore, the state has an interest in 
rnaintJi 11 ing the proper u ti I ization of the different procedures 
for independents to gain ballot position--those of local 
concentration using the independent candidate process (Sec. 
20 3-38) and those of state-wide concern using the 
independent pMty process (Sec. 20-3-2(g)(2)). The resulting 
design comports with the goals of voter understanding and 
awareness and efficient administration. It should be noted 
that such legislative alternatives for independent candidates 
was not available under the Illinois statutory scheme 
invalidated in Moore. 
The motion of minimal "notice" to voters 
throughout the state through the ten-county ten-signature 
requir21nent is crucial to the state interests. Without 
minimum notice to voters outside of the local focus of the 
party, neither support nor opposition can be mustered. While 
support from voters throughout the state is an obvious 
consequence of the requirement, a more important objective 
is the notification, at least to a small degree, of those who 
would want to oppose the success of the emerging party and 
its candidates. This right of opposition congenital to the 
election process of necessity requires early notification. While 
notice of a party's candidates will eventually reach all 
communities, the early opposition citizens might wish to 
initiate would be effectively undercut by the ability of a 
party to quitely, even privately, organize through completely 
locul procedures. The requirements reflect the policy 
(expressed by the sponsor of the 1969 amendment to Sec. 
20-3-2(g)(2)) that a party ought to merit "party" standing, 
ought to do more than "holding one meeting." The whole 
notion of "party" pragmatically connotes the sort of 
operations minimally required under Sec. 20-3-2(g)(2) and 
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tiw iriti'rc:;t·; uf citi1cns, both those supporting and opposed, 
Jrtc pr otccU'd hy 1111111 ma I no trf 1cat1on requirements. 
Thr fined phase of the Bullock test is that Sec. 
70 3-2(q)(2) "rnust be closely scrutinized and found 
rf'Jsona/Jly necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate 
state objectivr:s in order to pass constitutional muster." 
Bullock v. Carter, supra, a.t 856. In this balancing, weighing 
test, tile statute and state interests are relatively balanced. A 
statutory requirement which is arbitrary or rigid requires a 
showing of stronger state interests (ultimately up to a 
showing of a "compelling state interest") and a less 
burdensorne qualification can be justified by a weaker state 
interest. Under th is lest of "reasonable necessity", the state 
need not show a "compelling state interest", but only a 
leciitirnate interest sufficient to justify the minimal 
requirements of Sec. 20-3-2( g)( 2). Both the reasonableness of 
the Utah requirement and the existence and validity of the 
State interests involved are plotted above. Since 
distributional requirements are not unconstitutional per se, 
the h11rcJer1 on this court is to decide whether any such 
requirc111ent with a distributional provision of "kinder" 
proportions than Sec. 20-3-2(g)(2). Moreover, the court must 
also clecide whether "distribution" is the evil, or whether, 
viewing the statute "as a whole," it unreasonably or 
arbitrarily or unequally prevents new parties from securing 
ballot positions. A mechanistic approach without regard for 
the purposes and needs of Utah's election system would be 
injurious and self-defeating. The alternative to Utah's present 
system is a higher signature requirement which could 
constitutionally be vastly more burdensome. The present 
qualifying procedure is not only reasonable, but is also 
reasonably necessary to accomplish the important state 
interests involved. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the respondent respectfully urges the 
Court to sustain the lower court's ruling and uphold the 
constitutionality of the distributional signature requirement 
of Ser.tion 20-3-2 U.C.A. (1953) on the basis of t~e 
"reasonoble necessity" test of the equal protection clause. 
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UT/\! I 
COUtl'J'Y 1'01'. POPULl\'l'JON % Ol"l'IMJ\L NE'l' \'l\L, Vl\LUE 
Rf\!~ J: J t~ G NO. OF OF SINGLE RNl'IO 
SIGNJ\. SIGNi\. TO fflO .--------
Si.Ill Lc1J,c 1 4 Sl;, c.07 48.0 236 .000515 l: 1. 53 
ULah 2 137,776 14.4 71 .000515 1: 1. 53 
Weber 3 126,278 13.2 65 .000515 l: 1. 53 
Davie; 4 99 1 Q/.8 10.4 51 .000515 l: 1. 53 
caclie 5 42,331 '1. 4 22 .0005]9 1: 1. 52 
Box Elder 6 2B,129 2.9 14 .000498 1:1. 58 
Tooele 7 21,51!5 2.3 11 .000511 1: 1. 58 
Carbon 8 15,647 1.6 10 .000639 l: 1. 23 
\·/ashing ton 9 13,669 1.4 10 .000732 l: 1. 08 
Uintuh 10 12,G84 l. 3 10 ,000789 1:1 
ILLINOIS 
POPUINI'ION % OPTIMl>L NET VALUE VALUE 
NO. OF OF SINGLE RATIO 
SIG'm. .oo~Bgs l}~.~o0 -1 5,492,369 52. 9 ll3'14 
2 491,882 4.7 lOlb .002065 1:3.80 
3 382,638 3.6 790 .002064 1:3.80 
4 285, 176 2.7 589 .002065 1:3.80 
5 251,005 2.4 519 .002067 1:3.80 
6 250,934 2.4 519 .002068 1:3.80 
7 249,'198 2.4 515 .002064 1:3.81 
8 246,623 2.3 509 .002063 1:3.81 
9 195,318 1.8 404 .002068 1:3;80 
10 166,734 1.6 344 .002063 1:3.81 
11 163,281 1.5 337 .002063 1:3.81 
12 161,335 1.5 333 .002064 1:3.81 
13 125,010 1.2 258 .002063 1:3.81 
14 118,649 1.1 245 .002064 1:3.81 
15 111, 555 1.1 230 .002061 1:3.81 
16 111,409 1.1 230 .002064 1:3.81 
17 104,389 l. 216 .002069 1:3.799 
18 97,250 .9 201 .002066 1:3.80 
19 97,045 .9 201 .002071 1:3.795 
20 71, 654 • 7 200 ,002791 1:2.81 
21 70,861 . 7 200 ,002822 1:2.785 
22 62, 877 .6 200 .003180 1:2.472 
23 61,280 .6 200 .003263 1:2.409 
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